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Chap.

It is none of ye least objections against Freewill & selfepower wch is urged by some, yt it seemes to be a thing exempt from ye Divine Jurisdiction & from ^\Gods/ Omnipotence it selfe. For according to ye Common Hypothesis in wch Freewill is made essentiall to Raconall Creatures in all states, & ye Essence of Freewill is supposed to consist in ^\such an/active indifferency & self=determinacon, as implyes a Contradiction for it to be necessarily determined by any thing wtsoever without it, & therefore ^\{illeg}/ by God himselfe; It doth not only follow from hence wt some Philosophrs & Christians have asserted yt God cannot know beforehand wt any Freewilled Being will doe but yt wch seems s far more absurd, yt he can not act any thing at all upon ye Wills of them, all yt he can doe being onely to hinder, such externall {illeg} of their wills as must be done by outward strength \&/ power or els to annihilate them & dispossesse them \quite/ of their Beings, but at \their existing &/ being supposed yt they are, ye inward determinac~on of their wills is a thing noe way subject to ye Divine Omnipotensey neither can he contribute any thing ye least, to incline their wills rather one way than another.

This is a doctrine wch seems to be owned by some late Assertors of Freewill, And though ye first founders of ye Stoicall Sect, utterly destroy'd ye thing, allowing noe other Liberty to Man than such a Spontaneity as is in Brutes, yet some of ye Latter Stoicks as they departed from them herein, so they are supposed to ^\/ have run into this extremity, as to have asserted such a Freewill as was invincible to God him selfe, there is one passage \out/ of Arrians Epictetus before {illeg} Cited ^\ytsounds/ to this purpose, \&/ such also is yt in ye first Chap: of ye 1.st Book declare such secrets (this is supposed to be spoken by some ye have \{illeg}/ power over us) I will not decline them for this is absolutely in my own power; But then I will bind thee, Canst thou bind thee? thou canst onely bind my armes or Leggs, for Jupiter but as to my will Jupiter himselfe is not able to \{illeg}/ conquer yt.

Now as this is very strange to exempt anything in ye world from ye Divine Omnipotence So this Doctrine wilbe unavoidably attended with this inconvenience, yt if all ye freewilled Beings in ye world, Angells & Men should be supposed to determine their wills to ^\Sin & Wickednes/ evill & to continue there in God himselfe by h wch is a thing possible, God himself according to this Hypothesis must onely stand by & look on

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but he could noe way hinder this ruine & miscarriage of his Whole Creac~on, all yt he could doe could onely be to annihilate it, & then Create another world of Angells & Men & try whether it would have better {illeg} or noe & so toties quoties. It seems also plainly to be repugnant to ye ^\Religious/ Phænomena, I mean ye Common Notions & instincts of Mankind ^\{illeg} it/ for nothing is more naturall ^\{illeg}/ nor more essentiall to Religion, then for them ^\{illeg}/ to invoke & implore ye divine Assistance in order to Vertue & a Good Life, wch would be nonsense according to this Hypothesis, & there are some ranting Passages in Seneca to this purpose, as if it were simple to aka Good Mind of God |A| which is onely in a Mans own power to bestow upon himselfe, So yt he is not at all beholding to God for it any otherwise than in yt he bestowed such a power upon ^\him/ it. Nay all Prayrs & Supplicac~ons to ye Deity, for such externall thinges, as were to be brought to passe by ye Intercec~on of Humane Wills, would be altogether vaine ^\idle/ & frustraneous.

|3| Wherefore wee must needs declare here against this Hypothesis of Freewill as false & spurious in wch there are these three Errors or mistakes at once ^\couched &/ Complicated together, first yt Freewill is an Infinite selfpower, yt can with ye same case at any Time in a Mom.\t/ convert it selfe to ye highest degree of Vertue & lowest degree of vice whereas there is noe such power as this possible in nature neither would such an infinite selfe flexibility be any selfe power at all. ^\but meer ^\languid/ Flaccidity/ Secondly yt nothing can possibly be done to incline a Freewilled Being ye least {illeg} one way ^\more/ than another without destroying its Liberty, & therefore yt all Motives (or Reasons & Considerac~ons, yt can be Ꝑpounded or suggested signify nothing at all, to such a Being, as if Freewilled Beings were things Ꝑfectly cut off from all naturality, loose & unhinged from all their own Good. Lastly yt God with ^\by/ his Omnipotence can in noe Case wtsoever break in upon Free willed Beings to over rule them stop them or Countermand them, not so much as to Ꝑmote at any way to promote there good or happinesse & to keep ye - whole Creac~on from sinking & decaying & perfectly \or totally/ degenerating into all vice & wickednesse.

It is very true indeed yt it implyes a Contradiction for a Being at ye same time to be necessarily determined by somthing without it & yet freely & Contingently to determine it selfe from within. Morover it is plainly Contradictious for God to necessitate any Being to Sin not onely because, ye Will of God is ye Rule of Vertue & morality wch it <72> \wch yet/ has an immutable & Essentiall Will in \of his/ him yt \and/ himselfe cannot {illeg} \contradict/ but also because wtsoever is done by outward necessity cannot be sin, nor blameworthy, but it is an Error to think ^\that Freewilled Beings/ a person essentially such in all their actings, & soe independently upon God, as yt God Himselfe, cannot break in upon them, nor discerne ym {illeg} yt exercise of Freewill in them, wch when he doth, they will \could/ for yt Time be neither lyable to Blame or Commendac~on; for such Inclinac~ons & Determinacons as they were wholly passive to, It cannot be doubted but yt all Creatures are in Gods hand as ye Clay is in ye \Potters/ hands of ye Potter formakeble by him into any Shape & passive to any - impressions yt he will please· to make upon them. All actions & Inclinac~ons are either intrinsically Good & such as yt ye absence thereof \of them/ cannot be without Sin or ^\else/ intrinsically Evill or els \lastly/ such as may be, or not be, without sin Now Gods Power consider'd absolutely (without respect to his Wisdome & Goodnesse) extending to all thinges wch doe not imply a Contradiction to be done, doth \cannot but/ extend to ^\ye Ꝑduction & so/ all these in his Creatures \at least materially considered/ for it doth not imply a Contradiction & \for/ another {illeg} Wherefore as to ye former of these three, it cannot be doubted but yt God by his Omnipotence could in a momt convert a Devill into An Angell if it were agreable to his Wisdome, thus miraculously to interpose & disturb ye Course of nature, for why might not hee, yt could create an Angell in a state of Holynesse, be able also to translate or Metamorphose, yt is Destr a Devill into an Angell, yt is destroy yt vitious Habit in him, & infuse a vertuous Disposition upon him, in wch Change ye Metamorphosed Devil or Angell; would deserve noe Commendac~on ^\for it/ e Contributing noe activity of its own to \it/ ye Change

And for Adiaphorous Dispositions or Actions if there were a necessity for ye {illeg}\full/filling of any Prdiction or ye accomplishmt of any great designe of Providence, noe dbt but God could take as it were our wills ^\as it were/ into his own hand, as Ꝑhaps he may sometimes ^\do/ ye hearts of Kings ^\& Princes/ wch have ye greatest influence upon Humane affaires & turn them as ye Rivers of waters wch way he pleaseth, & for And for vitious Dispositions & actions there is noe more power required to them neither is there any more reason, why Gods Omnipotence could not extend to them also; \A/ but onely <73> onely because his Omnipotence is manag'd by his Goodnesse to wch it is contradictious for him so to doe ^\{illeg}/ it being ye worke of an abad Abaddon a Marrer or Destroyer, & not of a Good Creatour {illeg} ^\to spoile any of his Creatures & as it were to vnmake them &/ Thought he may use ye wickednesse of Men ^\allso/ for good ends of his own & Judicially hardne as being \some/ in there wickednesse w by withholding yt Assistance ^\in some {illeg}/ wch is necessary for their recovery. \I say/ Though it imply a Contradiction for any thing to be necessarily determin'd by God & yet contingently to determine it selfe at ye same time, yet it implyes noe Contradiction, for Freewilled Beings to be passive to Divine Determinac~ons \to prepossession to/ it being essentiall to Creatures as such yt they may be any way \to be/. Passive to ye Deity It is not essentiall to Freewilled Beings alwayes to determine themselves freely \willingly/ Nay it is possible for \them/ Freewilled Beings to have ye exercise of yt Faculty of Freewill ^\aswell as their Reason itselfe/ totally Suspended in them, for a while; and as it were consopited - For it is plaine there is noe more active use of Freewill & selfe power in Infants than of Reason, nor much if any in adult Ꝑsons when \in/ a Sleep and very little in dow^\ne/right Fools & Madmen, wherefore it is plaine \manifest/ yt Humane Souls are capable of ye variety & differt degrees of Life, For as they may be exalted to yt high\er/ participac~on of ye Divine nature So they may also become sink down even to brutishnesse itselfe, & become ye most pitifull & despicable thinges, even like ye Beast yt perish; Wherefore \And/ though yt Pythagoricall Opinion of ye transmigrac~on of Humane Souls into fe{illeg}ine Bodyes be justly to be exploded vpon other grounds, yet we cannot say it is impossible, for ye Divine power to deprive a Man of all exercise of yt Faculty of Freewill as well as of reason & to make him continue for many Ages in noe better State than yt was of his \our/ infancy or in noe higher degree of Life than we now {illeg} \or in what {illeg} we are asleep where/ a third part of our time in sleep ^\in ye silling of Dreames A/ Wee Mortales are lyable to become almost wtsoever God \will/ please to make us who yet will never ^\make vs soe \{illeg}/ without or own fault, nay/ being any to this low ebb of an irreversable insensibility of all difference of Good & Evill & an utter losse of all Morall Selfe power (wch is a state of brutishnesse, \&/ ye ^\very/ ruine & decay of yr Manly nature though never so much subtilty of Logic^\all Reason/ still remaine) till they ^\haue/ justly profited both by a long abuse of Them {illeg} fate may attend them God onely knowes

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Now from these prmisses we cannot but conclude, but yt God by his power may whensoever it is agreable to his wisdome {illeg}metamorphose humane souls from vice to vertue, as in ye Case before menc~oned if there could ever happen such an vniversall Ruine & Decay of Rationall Creatures, as yt by ye abuse of yt Freewill they should generally miscarry why a might not appeare in this Case wee doe not know. Wherefore we are far from denying a possibility of an irresistable Grace to be exercis'd by God and such an Election as is noe way conseqt upon our Faith & Conversion in order of nature but Antecedent to it.

But it is neither agreable to Scripture nor sound Reason for us to think yt none are recovered or saved without such an irresistable Grace and prventive Election as this is, yt is yt none become Good but by absolute fatality for ^\then/ it will follow from thence yt all yt are wicked are irresistably & fatally soe too. For as God doth not forcibly & miraculously make any Man vicious yt is brutish & Ignorant (though it is not beyond his power soe to doe) because it is ^\repugnant to his/ essentiall to his Goodnesse & holynesse so neithr doth he miraculously & irresistably make all Men Holy & Vertuous bec~ it is repugnant to his wisdome so to doe, some acct whereof we shall endeavour to give afterward in a peculiar Chap: |And according to that Hypothesis all Holines & Righteousnes would be a True & Proper Miracle|

Now here lyes another grand Objection against Liberty of Will & self-power, yt whereas ye Assertors of it have set up yt Hypothesis a for this very Reason yt they might thereby salve ye Phænomenon of Sin & free God from all Imputac~on of Blame in it they doe not consider how they doe in ye Mean time rob God of all ye Glory of vertue & Righteousnesse not attributing \denying/ ye Causality \of that/ thereof unto him ^\allso/ for if Men by their own freewill & selfepower (whereby they have a Dominion & Lordship of over their actions) are ye proper Causes of Evill then they must needs be soe \ye Causes/ of Good too. & be their own Saviours & Authors of their own happinesse.

But wee shall now undertake to shew yt as the Hypothesis of Freewill is necessary to be admitted to make Sin & Vice somthing, yt is reall Evills in nature & to free God from ye imputac~on of it, so it cannot at all be charged with this Inconvenience, yt it wipes God of \all/ ye Glory of Mens Righteousnesse & Salvac~on & derives ye Causality of it wholly upon themselves. |And if wee can really effect this & make it clearly appeare yt| as ye Hypothesis of Freewill free <75> from God from ye imputacion of Sin & Evill & Conseqtly of Mens damnation, so it no way robbs him of ye Glory of Mens Salvac~on then we shall have removed one of ye greatest prjudices yt is against this Doctrine

Now to make this out we shall first lay our foundac~on here yt Mankind are more by their own default in a Lapsed Vitiated & Depraved state by meanes whereof the strength of their Freewill & selfepower \is very much impaired/ as to true Righteousnesse, wch though it be called by very differt names whereof some are in more Credit than others, {illeg} somtime Morall Good Morality & Honesty & Vertue wch are not commonly in so grt repute, somtime Holynesse Godlinesse Divinity & ye Divine Life & nature yet I ta wch Expressions sound higher yet I take them all to be one & ye same thing. So yt we doe not now stand upon Even ground, but are under grt disadvantage & therefore stand in need of some other Divine Assistance to recover & repair this our lapsed state. Nay ye ruine yt we are under is soe grt as yt we must be regenerated & quite made over anew & transformed into a new Life differt from yt wch wee are now \first/ possessed with, before we can be truly either Holy or happy.

And we must observe here, yt this was ye great & fundamentall Error of Pelagius yt he denyed Mankind to beleive in a vitious state, but asserted yt Men as God made them at first had noe determinac~on to Morality one way than \or/ another upon them neither Vertuous nor Vicious Dispositions; but as Aristotle supposed yt ye Mind of Man in respect of Truth was in it selfe but Rasa Tabula, an Empty Table Book or White paper yt had nothing at all written in it but receive all its Notions by being afterwards scribled upon by Object without, So Pelagius supposed as Aristot & his followrs did yt Man as God & nature brought him into this world was a Perfect Blank as to Vertue or Vice & indiffert to either, till afterward by his own Free will & acc~ons he contracted a Customary Inclinac~on towards one \way/ or other, for so saith ^\And so indeed/ Aristotle ^\in his Ethicks/ as Men are not borne Archytects nor Musitians or Lutonists but onely by playing upon ye Lute often acquire such a Habit \in their fingers/ of moving ye Strings so or soe, So ye Case is ^\ye same/ for vertue or Vice ^\The same Pelagius held/ yt those ^\things/ are thinges \are/ of after acquisition, by action & Habit, for these are his own words Omne Bonum et Malum quo vel laudabiles vel Vituperabiles sumus non nobissum oritur sed agitur a nobis (a paces enim utrius non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita sine vitio nassimur; at ante Actionem & priæ Voluntatis id solum in Homine est quod Deus Condidit, And againe \So Juliane his Follower/ nullum est de Natura Conditione peccatum, sed L: A: in natura Hominum Ꝑseverat. And againe naturam Humanam in excedijs nascenti esse innocentiæ deus Locupatam

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Who also would endeavour to demonstrate yt it must needs {illeg} after this manner, Etiamsi Diabolus creavit Homines nullâ suà culpa mali essent, et Ideo jam nec Mali essent quia esse quisquam nisi quod natus est non potest nec ab Ea justum est aliquid amplius flagitare quam potest If one should suppose ye Devill to have made Men, yt they would not have been Evill by their own fault & therefore nethr will not blame-worthy at all since noe Man can be otherwise then wt he is made to be neither is it just to require of Sin more than by nature he can bee: |X|

Neither was this all Pelagius his Errour in wch he hath ye Consent of Aristotle & some other Heathen Philosophrs, but also he ventur'd to assert somthing further contrary to Aristotle himselfe & all other|s| Antient Philosophrs yt Freewill or ye Power yt Men have to Morall Good is not at all impaired by Sin or Vitious Actions but as if it were Essentially indivisible & could never be more or lesse in a Man was a like both in Vitious & in Vertuous Ꝑsons thus Julian his follower speaks for Him peccantes non \ad/ Abritrij Libertatem sed Conscientiam Justitiæ Ꝑ diderunt Librū autem Arbitrū et post peccatum tam plenum est quam fuit antepeccata, and againe Nos dicinius peccato Hominis non natura statum mutari sed meriti qualitatem: i:e: et in peccante hanc esse Lib~ij Arb~ij naturam Ꝑ quā potest a peccato definere quæ fuit in Eo ut possit a Justitia devi|B|are; \B/ wch Assertion is not onely contrary to Aristotle, but plainly repugnant, & ye to all sense & Experience & ye Common Notions of all Mankind yt by Vitious Habits ye power or strength to Morall Good is proporc~onably weakned & impaired. And \But/ I observe yt of late Times Many Men are ^\renderd/ something ^\more/ inclinable to this grosse Pelagian Errour meerly from a false Notion or Definition of L A: yt it essentially consists in such a power \Liberty/ of Contrariety, yt is, to Good or Evill yt one is ^\allwayes/ equally inclined & indiffert to one to one or other of them; In wch respect they take it to bee ^\such/ a thing as can never receive Magior~ et Mino~ any intenc~on or remission Those falsely yt conceived yt both ye Liberty & strength of Freewill consists in such an indifferency to those opposites Morall Good & Evill whereas its strenght is onely to Good & then it is in its ἀκμὴ or vigorous strength when it is soe fixed in Good - Morall Habits, & it is in ye Lowest degree of Languor & weakenesse, when it is fixedly & stupidly confirmed in Evill Habits, the possibility of Converting to Evill being really nothing but ye weaknesse of yt power called L: A: or <77> or Freewill, wherefore an Equilibriousness 'twixt Vertue & vice is not ye Power of Freewill nor Essentiall to it but a Certaine middle state of it in such as are neither way Vitious nor Vertuous. But an Infinite selfe flexibility & Power of turning ourselves in a Momt to ye Highest Vertue & \or/ ye Lowest Vice is noe Power nor any thing possible in nature noe more than it can be a power to be infinitely weak & strong at ye same Time

Nothing is more plaine in Philosophy than yt ye strength of Freewilled Beings as to Morall Good & Evill as diminishable & increaseable & therefore yt by com~itting of Evill actions it must needs bee Ꝑporconably impaired according to ye frequency & kind of them But yt noe Raconall Creature can be made by God in Ꝑfectly neutrall & Oudeterous state to Morall Good & Evill so yt \as if/ Morality did not \did not/ belong to a Man as a Man & according to his make noe more than to be a ^\good or bad/ Lutinist or Grammarian ^\did/ but yt both of them are meerly adventitious, & acquisitious affections or Denominac~ons coming in upon \Habits/ Actions we have demonstrated before; & therefore yt all Rac~onall Beings must be created by God πῶς διακεί μενοι somways or other affected towards Morality The τὸ μέσον of ye Soul ye Redoubled selfe active Life of ye Soul must needs have some certaine propensity \Respect/ or other in it towards yt higher Divine & yt Lower selfish Instinct of \selfish/ Life

And that in Men as they are borne Vertue hath not naturally a Predominancy in them though we shld set aside ye Scripture & wt it speakes of Adams fate & ye Redemption made by Christ is sufficiently evident by ye Common Phænomena of Humane Life. And therefore ye Lapse of Humane Souls was an Hypothesis admitted by ye best of ye Heathen Philosophers, though they could not give yt acct of it as \yt/ wee doe \can/ from Adams fall.

Now this being granted yt in Men as born into ye world ye power of ^\their/ Freewill is not equilibrious to Good & Evill but yt they are lapsed & sunk lower under ye Law of their Members predominating over them, it is necessary yt there shld be some further Assistance of Divine Grace to help them towards their recovery for otherwise they must needs be acknowledged to be under either an absolute impossibility or at least so great a difficulty of Recovery yt it would be a thousand to one whether they wld

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they would ever emerge againe. And who can make make any dbt but yt when a Man is deeply sunk into vitious Habits if Providence shld doe nothing at all towards his change & recovery ^\nothing to direct him in it/ but let him injoy ye gratificac~on of all his Lusts & Appetites without any Comptroul disturbance or inconvenience, he still enjoying \possessing/ Ꝑfect Habits & having all thinges according to his own mind, but he would continue in this sensuall Life to all Eternity. |X|

Wherefore we affirme yt Man being now by his own default plunged into such a state of degeneracy & Imbecility to Morall Good yt God doth not utterly leave him to himselfe in this Condic~on without affording him any help or assistance & standby onely & look on as utterly abandoning him whilst he \him to/ Ꝑish in this State but casts a very compassionate eye upon him & doth many wayes extend his Grace towards Him in order to his recovery to a state of true happinesse. And first though we could not challenge any thing from God in a way of debt when wee had Pvoked & disobliged yet he publikely declared to all in ye Gosple his readinesse to be reconciled \to all/ through his Son who hath made a Ꝑpitiatory Sacrifice for them as it were earnestly beseeching them to lay a side all Jealousies & distrusts of him & to close with his offered pardon upon ye termes wch he had Ꝑposed wch is unfeigned endeavo\r/ of amendmt according to yt power wch they have Ꝑmising them a fresh additionall supply & ye more to invite them hereto neither doth he {illeg} \onely/ help ye defect of their Ignorance by ye outward Instruction of a written word, but also quicken & stimulate them ^\Actively/ by hopes of the most glorious rewards on ye one hand & feares and \of/ ye most dismall punishmts on the other, these to be differtly dispensed at a publicke & solemne Day of Judgmt when All shalbe made to appeare before ye Grt Tribunall. Which Gosple Provision & De|i|claracon \spensation/ is ^\in itselfe/ a most powerfull Engine to worke upon all ye naturall powers \Faculties/ in Men & to rowz them up & awaken them. And therefore this is often called in scripture by ye name of Grace.

Secondly not to insist upon yt wise Contrivance & Constitucon of thinges yt God hath framed both within a Mans ^\selfe/ whethr there is somthing yt allwayes checks him for \& controlls/ wickednesse, & many Animall Passions ^\wch/ themselves are Provocac~ous & Spurrs to Virtue but also in ye Œconomy of ye ^\whole/ world ^\without/ where <79> where Vice & Wickednesse how much ^\soever/ pursued {illeg} is alwayes disgracefull & Vertue resplendt & Honourable because \But/ all these thinges may be thought to belong to nature though Nature it selfe is Grace as I shall shew afterward; and \wherefore/ I say, not to insist upon this, God is not wanting by speciall & peculiar Providence to contribute to ye Recovery of lapsed souls, according to their severall circumstances, though it be \& though/ in a way fully agreable to their own Liberty of acting & without offering violence to yt Free Principle in them yet powerfully & effectually to in order to their Good of ^\they correspōdētly/ put forth any readinesse to comply with ye same? Wee did before observe out of Plato yt Man hath not ye Soul\le/ Govermt of himselfe by his own Freewill, but yt God & Opportunity governe ye most of all Humane affaires. Neither is this true of Civill things onely but also of Morall, for ye greatest part of us is nature & ye least selfe activity. So yt ye Disposing of outward Providentiall Circumstances will have a grt \ sway &/ influence upon ye altering of our Morall Dispositions, & may Contribute very much either to Cacillate; or impede & obstructe ye improvemt of ye mind. Counsells exhortations ^\Providētiall/ Opportunities, affliction & castigations, cōtribute reasonable matter, to \have no small influence vpon/ or Morall Determinations - To think yt ye Faculty of Freewill is such an Indifferēcy in yt noth circūstances without vs haue any force at all vpō vs, is a great mistake. One of the Christian fathers calls a happy change & performation of Life made the gift of a feauer as if had not providence visited him opportunely with such a Castigation he the person had ^\probably/ continued as he was before And sant Paul himselfe that great Herold & Trumpeter of Grace was conuerted by means of \an/ extreordinary prouidence, wch though it was not without somthing of miracle, yet for ought wee know \it/ was without any irresistable force uppon his will, as therfore he did euer after throughout his whole life deseruedly acknowledge, \& admire/ that speceall grace of God by wch he was conuerted & made a hearty \sincere/ Christian |X Apostle|

But thirdly this is not all. For grace and prouidence doth not content itselfe to act soe remotely ^\onely/ but it makes closer \neerer/ approches to & ^\closer/ assaults uppon ye faith or \Fort &/ garrison of mans heart it beseigeth it, by inward motions and suggestions, {illeg} \{illeg} Cogitations/ ations Inclinations and attractions for as ye Contrary <80> powers are busy in this kind to worke uppon mans phansys & imaginations and raise seuerall Scens of thoughts to ym to allure and draw forth seuerall \unclean/ lusts from them soe it can not be doubted but God and those blessed Genij aboue those inuisable wat\c/hmen are actiue and uigilant in this kind to counterworth them there being as Plato somwhere speaks a perpetuall war in ye world betwixt the inuisable powers belonging to \of/ two seuerall kingdoms ye one of Light & ye other of darknes each one endeauoring to enlarge their teritories and encrease their parties \*/ [but ye artifice of diuine prouidence hath soe framed the contriuance and contexture of all things that ye worser things should not preuaile \{illeg}/ but that vertue may be triumphant & wickednes be kept under in the world] [ the whole Heaven and air is full of good and bad spirits and there is an immortall war betwixt them and therfore wee haue need to haue infinite caution but the Gods and Dæmons are our Assistants for wee are the possesciendi of the Gods and Dæmons] soe that unles wee be wanting to ourselues diuine grace and prouidence will not \never/ be wanting to us

Now this diuine grace of inward assistance afforded to ye Souls and minds of men, is not single but manyfold for there is both preuenting ^\or exciting/ grace that is before hand with us and anticipates ^\ye endeavours &/ the free principle in us wch if complied withall is seconded with further subsequent grace of inward corroboration, \&/ illumination ^\& Abstractiō/ and at last all is crowned with compleating confirming grace, without wch Soules can not be sure \{illeg}/ of their station in heauen itselfe but would be obnoxious to those Platonicall whirling correlations \Revolutions/ All free willed Creatures being in themselues lubricous and slippery, and therefore \Insomuch yt/ many of the Angels themselues bringing \yt/ not their principality \but/ lost their own ^\heavēly/ habitations; but of this completing & confirming grace wee speake more else where

Wherefore some divine grace doth both preuentiously begin \& excite/ and perfectually \concomitantly/ assist & carry on & astly \Vltimately/ consummate the worke of mans ^\Conversio~ &/ saluation ^\for his saluatio~ is partly but his Conversiō to God & Rightousness/ mans will & selfe power wch is taken along with it acting but a smale part herein; in the intermedious {illeg} wee may well conclude with the pious and learned Origen <81> that mans freewill & selfe actiuity doth contribute ^\uery/ much {illeg} attainment of the true good thro that diuine grace & power. This is the least that can be said \we haue to say/ in this busnes, that mans freewill and selfepower doth but contribute but a uery litle towards the bettering of our \his/ minds and yt diuine prouidence & grace has by far, the greater influence & Causality ^\{illeg}/ for afterward wee shall ascend to a higher Climax and show yt indeed all ye proper Causality \it is wholly and/ therefore entirely to be de\a/scribed to God and Grace. But for ye present let us call it as here it is, yt there is somthing don by ye will & actiuity wch God by nature has bestowne uppon man and \but yet/ yt God by Grace doth ye greater part. This is more largely declared by the fore mencioned Origen after this manner Pag 99 the true good of rationall Beings doth not wholly depend on his \their/ own proarresis Will or Election as som Philosophers asserted, but consists mixtly of that and by ye diuine power & Grace conspiring, for there is not only need of both these, to witt, of man's freewill and Gods conspiring Grace, or man (wch is not in the power of our will) to make a man Good holy & uertuous but alsoe to make ^\him/ that is good to perseuere therin for he yt hath attaned to ye greatest perfection in Rightuousnes would presently fall into ruin and decay if he should be puffed up with a conceit herof and arrogating ye cause herof to himselfe and if he should not ascribe the Glory of it to him who has contributed exceedingly much more towards ye acquisition & possesion then his owne will did By wch it appears \seems/ that this learned and pious Father is mostly censured by some as proleptically {illeg} \a Pelagian by Prolepsis,/ for as to inward Grace and diuine \spirituall/ assistance Pelagius {illeg} \to/ ye last would not acknowledge \it/ to be necessary but only \vsefull &/ profitable, Moreover he rightly concluds from these premises yt therfore the whole success of our spirituall improuement is allways to be as thankfully ascribed to ye diuine power and Grace and in this sence \to think/ of the Apostle is to be understood \it is/ not of him yt willeth nor of him yt runneth but of God That showeth mercy. pag 100 not as if God did shew mercy without our willing & running & \as/ if man did not at all cooperate but the because our willing & running is nothing at all in comparishon of ye Grace of God then to mans \own/ willing & running The same Author in his compars the forementioned place of Sa\t/ Paul's with two other places of Scripture The on yt in the 127 psalme except ye Lord build the house they labour in uaine yt build it except ye Lord keeps the Keep ye Watchmen watcheth but in vaine from whence it cannot be inferred yt the Carpenter or workman did nothing at all but yt without Gods {illeg} <82> all our endeavours in these externall things of Life, are \is/ insignificant and {illeg} the other passage is yt of St Paul himselfe the 1 of Corinth 3 I haue planted Apollo watered but God gaue the encrease soe then nether is he yt planteth any thing nor he that watereth but God yt giueth ye encrease It is plaine yt euen in these naturall things as in building & planting or keeping a City that is beseiged by enemies though it can not be denyed but yt mans Industry & endeauor is used in all yet the good success is by all ascribed according to ye instincts of nature unto God and much more ought thus to be in Spiritualls where God doth doe much more and mans will and endeauor far les Cum bonos at utrium fructas ad perfectam maturitatem {illeg} reget nemo pie et concenienter dicet quod fructus istos Agricola ferit sed a Deo fatebitur præscitos ita et eam nostra perfectio non quidem nobis cessantibus et aliosis efficetur nec tamen consumatio eius nobis sed Deo qui est prima et præcipua causa operis adscribetur Sic cum maris superauserit marina discrimina quam uis multo Labore nautar et omni nauticiteartir opere impense et Gubernatoris studio at industria adhibitus res agatur, uentorum quo aspirantibus fluctibus et astyrium signes diligenter notatis, si tamen nauis undis et fluctibus fatigatur\a/ ad portum salua perpenit, nemo sani sensus nisi misericordiæ Dei salutem navis ascribet Sed ne ipse quidem nauta uel Gubernatorandit duire ego saluam nauem sed totum ad Dei misericordian refert non quod senseat \sentiat/ re nihil ad saluandum nauem ver|l| artus adhibuisa uel Laboris sed quoniam sensit a se quidem laborem salutem {illeg} Deo præstitam naui \So/ when a Ship is tossed by a storme of|at| Sea, though ye marinars use much labour to preserue it and Steere it sofly, and the chief Pilate imploy all his art and industry to ye same purpose diligently obseruing both ye motion of ye winds and alsoe of the Starres if the Ship at last though \shattred &/ wearied with ^\long/ contesting with ye winds and billows ariue safe to ye mercy of God nether will ye chiefe Pilate dare to arrogate it to himselfe and say I haue saued the Ship wholy by \my/ own art and endeauour but will refer it to ye diuine Goodness, not yt he contributed nothing at all by his art and industry thervnto but yt \becaus/ notwithstanding his pains that deliuerance was owing to ye diuine mercy and Goodness but yt this without Gods prouidence and Goodness might haue proued vtterly unsuccessfull. Now if the case be soe in these ordinarys things of humane life, yt \notwithstanding or Endeavours the successe is attributed to/ in Good succesion our endeauours doe not derogate at all from Gods mercy & prouidence much but \more/ in Spirituall things where God acts more immediately \notwithstanding or small Activity ye {illeg} is to be/ doth ye activity of mans will derogate from divine Grace \ascribed to Divine God & Divine/ everything {illeg} ought to be ascribed intirely to God

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Now from this Hypothesis of mans will contributing something of its own activity but divine grace challenging \for/ the greatest part of yt wch is don in the inward par change of mens mind, towards good it seems yt God deals with mankind somthing on yt manner as Parents doe often with their Children {illeg} ^\yt will/ let them haue somthing in their own Custody as their own, but \yet/ not set much as to make them which forget ymselues and thinke them^\selves/ independent In those of whom they receiued it, and to whome they ^are \owe/ their Being but ^\will/ scope them in continuall ^\need &/ expectations of new voluntary ^\supplied/ superadditions, that they may not grow insolent but haue about becomes {illeg}& thankfullnes & subiection. Thus wee haue all by nature some small tallent of selfe actiuity, bestowed uppon us, wherby wee can contribute somthing ^\little/ to our own Good, but this is soe inconsiderable in itselfe that without continuall ^\new/ Superadditions ^\of Order/ it would proue alltogether uneffectuall, God \{illeg}/ keep\ing farre/ the greater part in his own hand {illeg} to make us know ourselues & ye dependance uppon him wch he {illeg} \{illeg}/ wisely dispenseth to us according to our Correspondent Compliances with his grace and improuements of what wee haue |A|receiued \A/ And that this is noe bigoticall conceit of Religionists only but a reall truth agreeable to ye Catholicke sence of ^\and {illeg}/ nature of all mankind appears from hence that all men are led by inward instinct rogare bonam mentem ^\a Deo/ to implore the diuine Assistance for the bettering of their minds ^\& for strength agst Tentations/ and it is obseruable that those who ^\are/ supposed to asserted such a freewill or Liberty in man as is inaimable to God himselfe, and wch he could noe way act uppon {illeg} ^\give their suffringe herunto for so/ Epectetus in Arrian Contradicting his own Hypothesis aduiseth all men in all their inward agonys and Conflicts with temptations to betake themselues {illeg} \for/ refuge to the diuine assistance & earnestly to implore the same as conceiuing they might receiue much benefit therby. Pag 213 when thou {illeg} portunatly assaulted by thine own ungouernable phansys see yt thou stoutly resists them & suffer not thy selfe to be snatcht away will then Consider yt this is a matter of noe small Concernment whether thou yeilds or not but a thing of the greatest moment of all it is a dispute Concerning a kingdom concerning Liberty tranquillity & ataraxy and now thinke of God and earnestly call uppon him as thy helper and assister {illeg} solelicitude and uehemency of mind, then ye Marriners ^\vp to call/ call uppon Castor & Pollux in a Storm & tempest ^\at sea/ for what more dangerious storme or tempest is there then that wch ariseth from strong phansies uiolently baring down \opposing/ person

Now that men doe naturally inuoke the Deity and implore his assistance for these strenthing of their minds against the Assaults of temptations is a plaine argument yt according to ye sence of nature mans free will is in it selfe insufficeant and stands in need of an aduentitious {illeg} assistance of diuine grace

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But to thinke as some doe \yt/ an inward will must be totally excluded as to any actiuity of indeauour whatsoeuer ^\towards God/ and yt all must be don uppon \him/ by an irresistable force & ther can be noe grace without this nor can God haue glory of mans Conuersion & Saluation, otherwise This is \seems to me but/ but a rude and Rusticall conceit ^\of a Deity/ & \and allso/ far from the truth, and as for in absolute fatality & irresistable necessity there can nether be uertue nor piety, there being nothing but Gods own acting and what could ^\not/ be possibly otherwise then it is, and therfore noe foundation for blame or Commendation in ye Creature. Moreouer they that will needs exe haue all men to be saued & made good by an irresistable Goodnesse forc'd uppon them, they must needs determine alsoe yt all men are \shall are be/ damned by an irresistable wickednes wch they could noe|t| way auoyd, that is, yt ether they had a wicked Nature or else were made wicked by diuine fate. To assert either of wch is all one as to say, that they had noe wickednes at all in them, but were \are/ damned merly by will & power without Justice, and yt ye Deity is such a Being whoe glorys in nothing else but in an arbitrary distribution of happines and misery uppon his Creaturs in fondly loueing \doting upō/ the Persons of some, and keeping \vp/ all feauours & delights \praises/ uppon them as \wch/ they can possibly receiue & {illeg} \most/ partially Hating others and tormenting them \ex beneplicito/ to all Eternity. Lastly if all Vertue be by irresistable fate or necessity and not freely exerted from any inward principle by \then/ that being in wch it is then it can neuer call it ^\a perfection of/ its own it being only a thing clapt uppon it, \wch is as Passive/ noe more then the banks can call ye water its \their/ own that \glides/ runs throw it ^\between them/ nether could God haue \receve/ any hearty Loue or deuoute affection from his Creaturs all theire Diety being a more forcing|ed| ^\& violent/ and or artificial thing, Where as in truth God desires from his Creatues somthing yt is \inwardly/ ymselues; yt freely & naturally floes from them when uitally springs from in themselues \& is \actively/ uitall in them/ As he would {illeg} haue ym decked with ornaments of their own and to haue an inward \innate/ {illeg} and not to be drest up wholy with ascititious ^\& borrowed/ things & \or/ to be daubd ouer with paint & Varnish.

Wherefore the thing wch providence is allways endeauoring \after/ it ^\gently/ to prolicite ^\allure/ and draw forth the free principle in man yt it may ^\from/ with in it selfe actiuely display yt Life ^\of its own/ wch it at once Vertue Piety & Happines. All ye \/Methods of providence tends to this, and all things are most artificially contriued by it in order to this end, nether doth God think himselfe glorified any otherwise by his Creaturs then when himselfe & Vertue are thus freely and Heartally loued and earnestly \panted/ pursued after \by them/ from an inward ^\vnstraind &/ and unforced principle |A| of their owne: \A/ But it is a most {illeg} ^\& cyclopicall/ conceit of the Deity by wch it is much wronged to thinke yt it Seeks to glorify itselfe Cyclopically only by power & thunderbolts, \or by meer ^\irrationall/ Will & arbitrary favour/ and by engrossing all Activity wth its own hands it no so doing all itself and not suffering any thing else \to act besides/ All wch is but an indigāt & snarking desire of Glory vnworthy of ye Deity.

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But ye worst Ꝑjudice of all in this kind is this yt \some/ they cannot think any thing to be Grace to them unlesse it were partially bestowed on them. & ye greatest part of Mankind \be/ as partially excluded from it, \ye former/ That there is noe Grace shewed to themselves unlesse there be cruelty exprest to others wch whereas this is nothing but a narrow self-love of their own yt would make them monopolize ye Divine favour, from whence also is yt concept wchthey have of ye Deity yt it cannot think it selfe free otherwise than by an irrac~onall Arbitrary self Will & if it be ty'd up by any Goodnesse Wisdome & Equity.

But now because Any thing besides absolute & irresistible fate ^\partially determining salvatiō to some few & absolutely excluding all ye Possibility of it/ is commonly branded by some by ye name of Pelagianisme Wee shall here briefly shew also yt this is a great mistake, And to this purpose Wee must a little unravel Church Antiquity First therefore Wee shall observe yt before Pelagius started up it was ye generally received Doctrine of ye Antient Chatholick Xtian Church & St. Augustin himself ^\consenting/ that Ꝑdestinac~on to Glory & Elecc~on was by Ꝑscience & foreknowledge of Mens Faith & Repentance \XA/ In Origens Philocalia This is ye title of ye 25t Chapt: , That Ꝑdestinac~on out of foreknowledge doth not destroy freewill In wch it is asserted . That Ꝑdestinac~on is not ye Cause of Justificac~on & Gloryficac~on, but foreknowledge is before Ꝑdestinac~on according to yt of ye Scripture whom he foreknew them he also Ꝑdestinated; neith to be conformable to ye Image of |B| his form, \B/ Neither did {illeg} from Origen as some Ꝑtend as if he had infected those yt followed after him therewth Nor did those yt followed after Pelagius receive this Doctrine wholly from him For to spare Ꝑticular quotac~ons here ye Late Authour of ye Pelagian History pronounceth universally Græci patrei sempre Patrum Latinorum verò Illi qui ante Au~stinum vixerunt dicere solent eos esse Ꝑdestinatos ad vitam, quos Deos pie recteꝗ vivere Ꝑvidet sive ut alij loquunt quos Ꝑvidetare {illeg} And Prosper Himselfe who so much opposed Pelagianisme pœnè omnium Parinvenitur et una Sententia qua Ꝑpositum et Ꝑdestinac~onuem Dei, ut ab hoc Deus alios vasa honoris, alios vasa Contumeliæ fecerit, quia finem {illeg} Ꝑviderit & sub ipso Gratia adjutario, qua futurus esset voluntate et actione Ꝑsuivit

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From wch last words ^\of Prosper we may observe yt/ they did not understand by Prescience a foreknowledg of what Men ould doe only by ye strength of nature without any assistance of Divine Grace; but of ye (wch was ye Doctrine of Pelagius) but of wt they would doe in complyance both with ^\both/ ye Ꝑventing & subsequent Grace of God. And all, both before & after Pelagius did determine, yt none should be damned because they could not obey God but onely because they would not, & ye most Zealous Opposers of Pelagius themselves {illeg} an Anathema upon \those that/ those yt any held yt any one was Ꝑdestinated to Evill: Wherefore they all asserted Divine Grace not by way of exclusion of L: A: but in consistency with ye same. But when they ^\St Austin/ determined yt Men were not saved meerly according to Merits there meaning was, onely this, yt they were not saved by ye Merit of what they did onely from ye strength of nature wthout ye Assistance of Divine Grace. So yt they had either noe Grace at all; or els noe other than wt was first merited by ye worke of meer Nature wherefore all ye Difference betwixt ye Orthodox & ^\the/ Pelagians \was/ Whether may a Man by his naturall Power of Freewill without any ^\inward/ assistance of Divine Grace antecedt thereunto c~ld merit & Lowre to himselfe {illeg}all Salvac~on, & St Austin himselfe (though somtime in his heat of Opposition against ye Pelagians) he seem'd to be transported further than ye rest & to have held a singular Opinion of his own yt so \seems/ hardly reconcileable with any Power of Freewill, yet he often {illeg} & contradicts it agen, & by all means endeavours to decline ye Odium of destroying L: A:

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And whereas it was very obvious here to object yt we plainly see by experience, yt all Men have not ye same advantages, by Divine Providence afforded to them in order to their Repentance & Amendmt yt others have having not ye meanes of Grace alike afforded them nor Oppertunity & length of time wch therefore should seem to be referred to some Absolute and Antecedt Ꝑdestinac~on the Antient Fathers often declared yt though this is a certaine unsearchable Depth wch Humane Wit can never fadom yet wee must beleive yt all these thinges are ordered & dispensed in away of Justice likewise, & not according to absolute Will & purpose & therefore are to be referred ad occulta Divinæ Justitiæ to ye Secrets of Divine Justice. Though indeed it is well known yt Origen & his followers following ye Platonists here did Venture to assert ye προιπ{illeg} of the Soul meerly to solve this Phænomenon.

But there is one thing yt may be alledged against wt wee have asserted yt all ye Antients before Pelagius made Election & Ꝑdestinac~on to be subseqt decrees of God, after foreknowledge & not antecedt & absolute That St Austin doth so often {illeg} ^\excitate/ yt Opinion of Pelagius yt Grace was bestowed according to Merits & Condemne it as Hereticall as otherwise he could not have done if all ye Antient Fathers had been of ye same Ꝑsuasion but to this wee answer, yt that wch he condemned as Pelagian & Hereticall was wt ye Antients never asserted yt without any Ꝑventing Grace at all a Man by his Freewill & naturall powers might Merit & deserve ye Grace of God, And thus St Austin himselfe explaines it Hoc quippe ita dicunt Pelagiani velut Homo a seipse sine adjutorio Dei habeat Ꝑpositum bonum studiumꝗ virtutio quo merito precedente dignis sit adjuvari Dei Gratia sue sequente, And againe Meritu ante Gratiam et ideo Contra Gratiam defendentes priores voluntare Deo en L: A: et retribuatur ijs Gratia Ꝑ Ꝑmio. In opposition to wch Doctrine St Austin thus opposeth Hominis propositu~ bonum adjuveat quidem subsequens Gratia sed nec ipsum esset nisi Ꝑcederet Gratia. That is there is not onely a Grace of God subseqt to Mans Freewill, but also there is Ꝑventing & Exciting Grace wch Pelagius denyed to be acknowledged wch ye Antient Fathers asserted & Pelagius denyed

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Indeed I think it out of Question yt St Austin himselfe after he had been engaged in ye Pelagian Contest did change his opinion from a Ꝑvisionall Ꝑdestinac~on (wch he held before) to an absolute one, though somtimes he Contradicts againe himself in his latter writings but however this was but his private opinion wch zealous Opposers of Pelagianisme rejected, others \&/ would neithr affirme nor deny, but thought it noe way necessary to be asserted.

By all this it appears yt Orthodox Antiquity & ye Assertors of Grace against Pelagius did not altogether banish Freewill & introduce a fatall Necessity of Every mans being either said or damn'd, frustra blasphemas, sit et ignorantiam Auribus nigeris sth St Hierom Nec L~bru~ Arbitru~ condemni{illeg} damnetur Ille qui damnat. Nay St Austin himselfe in his latter writinge often endeavours to salve L: A: & reconcile it with his Hypothesis Grace & Ꝑdestinac~on.

Having given an acct now shew'd, yt all ye Antients did assert a Complicac~on of Divine Grace & Freewill together, I shal onely add here, yt though L: A: contribute some little thing yet it|this| doth not follow from thence derogate any thing at all from God For as much as Freewill it selfe is in some sense a Divine Grace & it is very weak to think yt nothing is to be ascribed to God but wt is afterward cast in upon us by way of Superaddition to wt wee had received from God by nature, & as if we could chalenge all ye rest to our selves And ought not to acct it Gods whereas in him wee live & move & have our being all our Naturall Powers, wtsoever is Good in ye whole universe is Gods & not ye Creatures & there is nothing yt can truly be asserted unto us but onely sin & Errour yt is ye wrong use of our own Free power. In ye right use of this power when it acts according as it was intended by God & nature God is justly entitled to ye Causality of those effects but when wee employ it otherwise than anie should doe ye {illeg}Carriage of it is onely to be ascribed to <89> to ourselves Nay there is much more Glory due to God yt he would endue us with such a Power & Dominion over our selves & Actions than if himself had acted all thinges necessary in us more Glory of his power for to be able to make selfe active & selfe-powerfull Beings is Greater power than to make nothing but Machins & Neurospasts & much more Glory of his Goodnesse yt he would Ꝑmit us to possesse somthing as our own & would capacitate us also to receive prayse & Commendac~ons for our own Actions {illeg}ry this to his Creatures And therefore it is plaine yt some Men are here \but/ Childishly afraid \affrighted {illeg}/ bugbeares wch indeed Ꝑceed onely from \reasō of/ a superstitious fear of ye Deity.

But all yt we have said hitherto is yet short of ye maine businesse & yt wch is ye very bottom of this controversy betwixt ye Pelagians & ye Orthodox in this point (wch is indeed a Controversy of noe small moment) is still behind. For ye Pelagian Spt supposes yt Righteousnesse is nothing els but a conformity of externall actions to an Outward & written Law, arbitrarily made, or els a customary Ꝑpensity of doing some externall acc~ons, acquired by frequency of acting like to yt ^\Habits of/ of singing & dancing & such other Habits, And \like, wch {illeg}/ Aristotle \seems {illeg} to Favour./ often approaches very neer to this apꝐhension. And many Men are prone to have this slight opinion both of Religion & Morality, & to content themselves with such a slight shallow & superficiall (nay I may also say) carnall piety & vertue, as yt wch is ye onely true & reall; ^\concluding/ All other being concludes to be meerly phantasticall & Enthusiasticall. And therefore noe wonder if these doe soe highly extoll Freewill & ye Power of nature It being soe Evident yt wee have a naturall Power & Command over our outward Man & Actions These Men conceit yt ye Divine Lawes & Lawes of Religion, are \but {illeg}/ but just like to Civil Lawes, & yt there is noe difference at all between them, save onely in this, yt ye one are made by Men & ye other by God, whereas indeed ye one contents itselfe onely with outward Actions, there being nothing els Cognizable in foro Humano, but ye Eternall Law of God & Nature is given to ye mans will itself & requires a certaine inward \Life &/ Disposition of Life \& Life/ Wherefore ye Scripture Oracles plainly tell us, nay Truth it self speakes it silently in our Souls, yt to Man in this lapsed State, ^\yt/ in order to yt Life wch is clearly {illeg} & <90> & Divine ^\& {illeg} In order to True Righteousnes/ there is need of novâ Genitura, a new Creac~on & & generac~on of ye Soul, a new life, Spt & Nature to be together in it; & indeed in this lyes a great part of ye Mystery of Christianity, yt Wee ought not to acquiesce in our own Righteousness done by ye power of Freewill & strength of Nature, in our unregenerate state, but seek after another Divine Righteousnesse, wch is ye Righteousnesse of God by Faith, A Righteousnesse of Gods own working in us, whilst we desparing of our own Ability & removing all ^\{illeg}/ dependance upon ye same, beleive in ye Divine Power & Goodnesse & expect to receive it from thence onely. Wherefore wee doe say agen; yt ye Law of Gods everlasting Righteousnesse ye Norma & Mensura of it, is not meerly & \an/ outward Letter commanding externall act^ions yt are in every Mans own power ^\to do/ it is not meer Will & Words, but it is a Light\fe/ Spt of & Nature. & as ye Scripture often tells us ye Life Spt & Nature of God Himselfe, acting upon & Communicating ^\itselfe/ to Rationall Creatures. Let those wch are Strangers to this Righteousnesse & ye uncircumcised in heart, laugh never soe much at a Righteousnesse infused, yt is, in their Language, in powered & Graces inspired yt is as they phrase ^\it/ in-blown, & think yt this Derision is a sufficient confutac~on of all Christianity, yet Wisdome wilbe justifyed by her Children, & ye Sonnes of wisdome will ever Justify this Truth of Christianity, yt ye inspirac~on of ye most high giveth both understanding & Righteousnesse & yt true Vertue & Piety though it be no Fanatick nor Frantick Enthusiasme yet as some of ye Heathens Philosophrs themselves {illeg} \apprehended is to be ascribed/ θειᾳ τινὶ επιπνοῖᾳ to a Certaine Divine afflac~on & Instinct

Neither indeed is any thing more plaine if we consult Reason & our own inward Sense then this yt it must be soe, For Freewill & selfepower doth not make any thing but alwayes turne itself to somthing or other yt is, where there are divers Congruities wch cause a distraction in ye Soul, thereby this power ye Soul is able to turne it selfe {illeg} to one of other Freewill neither makes Righteousnesse nor wickednesse but in wicked Men ye Soul turnes & determine it selfe wholly, to those Lower & Easy Congruities of nature, of Animall Lust & Selfish Desires, & as we said before wicked Men are as well inspired by a Certaine lower Mundane Sp\t/ of ye Animall Life & nature As Good Men are by yt Higher Spt of ye Divine Life & Nature And when ye word Enthusiasme is taken as com̄only it is in a {illeg} Sense it Ꝑperly <91> it may Ꝑperly be attributed to ye former of these though not to ye Latter, It ^\That/ being a Blind Irrac~onall & Dark Impulse when Men are carryed away Captive by ye worser principle in them but ye other being {illeg} & Gentle instinct yt is accompanied with ye Clearest Light & Serenity, it being ^\{illeg}/ a Diviner thing than Reason as Aristotle himselfe & other Philosoprs have observed {illeg} λογου θειατιγον The Soul of Man hangs as it were betwixt two Loadstones God & ye World ye Divine Life & Spt above or ye Lower Spt of ye World The Animall Selfish Nature And though it hold indeed a \some/ Power of turning it selfe to either ^\by degrees/ yet it properly makes neither of them; ye Magick of ye Lower Nature makes one thing by attracting & falscinating Souls under it, but yt Divine Magick or attraction if it may be so called (for yt \Magick/ was A Good Name \Religious Word/ at first among ye Persians) makes ye other.

All yt A Man can doe by his own Freewill & selfepower is onely to use some Conatus or Endeavour; to yt turne himselfe towards yt τὸ ἐν {illeg}ῖν θεῖον & τὸ {illeg} τῷ παντὶ θεῖον That Divine Principle yt is in our selves & \is/ in ye whole world \vniverse/, yt is to God himselfe who is more properly seated & ought more to be sought \for/ in fundo Anima {illeg} of in ye inmost bottome of our own Soul then in ye Highest heavens & there to be lookt for without us.

Nay this power of ye Soul doth rather consist in some endeavours of turning itselfe from ye Lower & Sinful Life of Corrupt Nature by denying to obey ye Dictates of it to gratify its Importunities & make Ꝑposion for it it extends \{illeg}/Ꝑperly onely to Mortificac~on \onely/ ye killing of ye Life of ye Old Man is onely starving of it, & \or/ refusing to feed it; & then as Ꝑpared Matter \{illeg}/ {illeg} Life \&/ Forme; yt Divine Life seiseth upon it & enters into it For ye Soul must needs be alwayes under one Life or {illeg}this lower Life {illeg} is, as it were broken & \{illeg}/ abated in it & thus reduced as it were into a Chaos, then doth ye Spt of Divine Life seise upon it & hatch it into Forme & Pulchritude

All yt Wee spake of before was onely this turning or Conversion of ye Soul from ye lower Life of Sinfull Nature in wch as wee have shewed also Mans Freewill doth not doe all ^\{illeg}/ but ye least part of it & That Triple \Divine Grace/ Ꝑventing & exciting corroborating & Ꝑmoting, confirming & Compleating, doe justly challenge\ing/ for ye greatest share in it

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Whereas if Freewill had done all here, It had done but little; nothing yt it could prove it selfe in, For \as/ when a Man lying in a darke cold Cave by degrees crawls out of it & comes ^\vp/ into ye Light & warmth of ye Sun & feels his heat \cōfortable Rayes/ reflected round abt him, hee will have little Cause to attribute yt cheering & reviving Comfort of warmth & Lighth wch he now \feels/ receives to himselfe & not to ye Son from whence it comes. The Morall reformac~on of Mens souls as ye Philosophr defin'd it is but the Circumduction of ye Soul out of yt Dark Cave & stupifying Cave where it could see nothing but shadows of thinges to ye true Light & Life as to ye\a/ Certaine Sun, and Our Saviour himself defined it to bee but ye opening of ye Eyes & ye turning of ye Soul from Darknesse into Light & from ye power of Satan into God Wee have All by Nature as it were our backs \turned vpō/ towards ye Sun of Righteousnesse & All yt Wee have to doe or candoe is onely to turne our selves abt towards it & to open or eyes yt wee may at once receive ye Light & \see/ Warmth of it; And therefore Wee cannot ascribe either of these to our selves, but onely to God from whom they flow. And \But/ soe long as wee think to quicken & enliven our selves with our own activity & ye power of our own Freewill & to enlighten ourselves, or to see by our own Eyes ^\or own Nat. wit & Reason, still/ continuing in yt Dark Cave Wee doe deceive our selves & wee shall never come neither to ye Light nor to ye Life of God

All ye Activity yt Wee have is only of Converting or turning our selves to It or rather of turning our selves from it ^\ye Contrary to it/ in wch Divine Grace \allso/ chalenges ye greatest part, but we are passive to this Light & Life of God acting upon us. And all truly holy & spll actions yt are done by ye Soul are done by Vertue of yt Divine life & Spt acting in it & therefore cannot possibly be attributed to Mans Freewill. And this is yt very thing wch Pious Antiquity was soe zealous to assert, yt All Holy affections pious Inclinac~ons & Spirituall Actions were not to be attributed to Man Freewill but to Christ & ye Divine Spt in Him, wch yet is not so to be understood as if Man were to bee wholly sluggish & could contribute nothing towards ye Ꝑmoting or turning it \him/ self towards yt Divine Principle, as some fondly conclude, but yt all yt wee can doe in this kind cannot entitle ye least to ye Causality of ye thing it selfe wch is only Gods, noe more than ye opening of our Eylids against ye Sun cann <93> can make; ye Light ^\to be/ ours: there are Many naturall actions in wch we contribute somthing antecedtly & by way of Ꝑparac~on to nature & yet ye Effect it selfe is not ^\at all/ ascribed to us, but to God & Nature onely; though Man labours in plowing of ye Ground & sowing of ye Seed, yet it is ye Spt ^\or Plastick Power/ of nature ye forms ye Grace & God yt gives ye encrease; in ye Generac~on of Animals ^\one Animall/ is but ministerially subservient to nature in ye Ꝑduction of another; for he yt Generates doth not make ye Life & Soul of yt that is begotten Nay he doth not organize ye Matter neither but it is ye Spt of Nature or its plastick & Spermatick power yt doth one, & ye other yt is ye New Soul comes into ye Ꝑpared Matter wee know ^\not/ how \nor whence/. So all yt Man can doe by his Freewill yt must be here also assisted by Grace) is onely somthing Antecedanious & Ꝑparatory for ye Divine Form ^\& life/ to enter in & seise. it is nothing but its ye turning of it selfe by degrees from ye Contrary Life & then yt wch is ye Life of all lives yt ever enters into & actes upon Rac~onall Souls when it is not exluded, seiseth upon it.

But it must not be concluded from hence yt Righteousnesse is a foreigne thing clapt upon ye Soul, or A thing supernaturall in this Sense as if it were really Ꝑternaturall & \or/ Contrary to ye true Nature of ye inward Man, wch as we have said is grounded upon God himselfe, or is ye|t| same Immateriall Heaven in which God dwells, e very Heathens them selves Ꝑceiving yt there was a Great Cognac~on betwixt ye Soul purged from wt was Heterogeneous & Aliene to it & God Himselfe. So yt Grace is neither a Violent & forced thing nor yet meerly Artificiall because it is to be ascribed wholly to God, For it is nothing but ye Soul, wch was before estranged from God, naturalizd againe to him; & reunited to its true Sourse & Originall All yt outcry wch is made against nature is to bee understood onely of Corrupt & Apo vitiated and Apostatized Nature, not ^|Mani{illeg}ically| of Mans nature as God at first made him \it/, wch was to be Conjoyned wth ye Divinity & acted by it.

Neither should it be inferred from wt wee have said yt that Divine Life which is Grace & Righteousnesse is altogether arbitrary for then it would follow from thence also yt it were to noe purpose for us to use any endeavours to turne our selves towards it <94>

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N. 5th. This is yt wch ye Antients were wont to call τῶν ἐν τ{illeg} ἐξουσια \των/ προ ομινοις \ἀντι{illeg}/ A Power of doing opposites. A self determining being is yt wch is loose & not determined to wt it doth, by \any/ Antecedt naturall necessity; \{illeg}/ & therefore is capable of uncertainty & some variety of Acting \and hath/ & there is something of ^\vncertain/ Contingency more of lesse in \it/ ye Actions of it Aristotle Speaking of ye Motion of loving Creatures ^\as such & a distinct {illeg}/ wch in some sense are αυτοκίνητα, or selfe moving, writes after this manner ἄλογον το μὶαν κὶνποῖν κινεῖσθε μόνον ὁ φ'ἀυτῶν οιγε ιαυτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινοῦσιν, It is absurd to suppose yt such thinges as move themselves should alwayes move one way ὀι ἐπ' ἀυτῶ το ἄναφερ{illeg} τωπυρὶ δῦλον ὅτι κὰι τὸ κάτω, ἐί του βαδιζειν ἀίτιόν τι ἀυτῷ κὰι {illeg} βαδιξειν. If fire had a power to determine its own power \motion/ upward then it is manifest yt it could determine its moc~on downward also & that wch is a|n| \Actiō/ Cause of walking may also be a Cause of not walking. And so it ^\these things all Animals/ will in some sense have ἐξουσίαν τῶν ἀντικοιμίνων a power of {illeg} opposites \or cōtraryes/ yt is either of Contrarys or COntradictorys but But this is much more true of Freewilled Beings for though Brutes are Capable of variety of Action according as their inward Appetites (wch are Changable) determine them) or doe not alwayes act one way as inanimate things doe yet they are ^\thought to be/ necessitated by Phansy & Appetite in such \like/ Cases alwayes to doe wt they doe \alike 1/ So yt such outward objects being put & such inward Appetites, they cannot doe otherwise, than they doe But Freewilled Beings have a more interior selfepower \so/ yt ye same outward objects being put, & ye same Animal Appetites or Inclinac~ons wthin, & they may possibly act differently, and therefore it may be better sd of them οτι δ{illeg}ντας ου πράιτουσι πράξαι τὸ ἀντικείμένον, that they have a power of doing ye Contrary to wt they doe, doe. For they can τῶν ἀυτῶν περι εξῶτων ὅτε μὲν ὅυτως ὅτι δὲ ἀλλωι ἐνεργειν i. e. in ye very same Cases & Circumstances somtimes act one way & sometimes another. they are not alwayes necessarily determind by outward objects ^\& ye Impulses therefrom/ Their own Animall Inclinac~ons. The Doctrine of Zeno & ye old Stoicks who denyed Freewill as thus described, by an Antient Peripatetick \167/ That wee are Master of Nothing but are alwayes follow ye Circumstant thinges yeilding \vpō plea/ to them & being overcome by them, & doe wt wee doe, because it is necessary for us soe to doe, & we cannot doe otherwise

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It being impossible for us such things being circumstant, or in such Causes, to doe otherwise then wee doe, because \we cannot/ it is impossible for us to resist resist ye circumstant thinges or to \nor/ act otherwise than they encline us, /or act vpon vs.\

But ye Contrary to all this is yt wch was maintained by ye Antient opposers of ye Stoicall Doctrine yt wee are Masters of somthing, & doe not alwayes soe follow ye circumstant thinges, being {illeg} them, as yt wee could not possibly doe otherwise than wee doe; but yt is possible for it, wn ye same Thinges are circumstant (i e) in ye same cases & circumstances somtimes to act one way & sometimes another. Wee being able to resist both ye outward objects & our own Animall Affecc~ons & \soe/ to determine ourselves.

And if ye now vulgarly received Definition of a Freewilled Agents yt it|they| is|are| such as Positus omnibus ad agendum requisitis potest agere et non agere be taken in noe other sense than that before menc~oned namely that it is such a thing as τῶν ἀυτῶν περι εστώτων ὃτι μὲν ὃυταν ὅτεμὶν ἂλλωι ἐνεργεῖν διωατας, yt in ye same Case & circumstances it may possibly act differently sometimes one way & sometimes another then there is noe Exception to be made against it, but according to ye Common Acceptac~on of it there are these 2 mistakes \included/ in it First yt in evy acc~on of Mans Life one \he/ is ^\alike/ equally indifferent to doe or not doe, to act this or yt till yt very momt ye he is determined. Secondly yt ye Practicall Judgmt it selfe is made to be one of ye requisites of Action & yt a Free Agent is indifferent to act \ether/ according to it or not ^\against it/ Besides wch there is another Grand Errour also wch ye Assertors of this Doctrine are Guilty of wch wee shall insist upon afterward yt this loose uncertainty of Acting in freewilled Beings is \{illeg}/ a pure Ꝑfecc~on and that ye Ꝑfectiō of Freewill doth consist in a loose Indifferēt selfdeterminatiō any way.

Some Latter Authors exp describe this selfe determining power after this manner yt it is yt whereby a Free Agent|s| can ad vim et Motum Causæ a quâ fuerat primum impulsat aliquid adjecere, et impetum, quem aliunde non acceperat, addere, can contribute & cast in somthing of its own to ye impulsive causes & mom\ts/ of Reason, yt sway \encline/ this way & that way, to turne ye sowles, and superad this \a certain/ force of its own wch it had not recd from any thing els, & ^\of/ wch there is noe other Cause to be taught for besides itselfe. \but it was originall to {illeg}/ Hence is yt notable difference assigned betwixt Man & other Living Creatures . That whereas all other Creatures follow ye Curcumstant causes wthout & are \passively/ determined by them it is otherwise in man whoe Essence consisteth in having a principle & Cause of action wthin himselfe <97> & not being necessarily determined by circumstant thinges wthout him. thē {illeg} to ye Impulsive causes of actiō

Now Man having a selfe determining power of his acc~ons there is oftentimes noe other cause to be required \or {illeg}/ why he doth this rather than another thing \that/ but onely by himself. And otherwise he cld not be lyable to blame & Commendac~on. Pag: 166: As wee doe not ask a Reason why Earth & other heavy Bodys descend Ꝑpendicularly according to ye Laws of Gravity; or for wt reason \why/ Brute Animals doe wt they doe according to ye Instincts of nature Every one of these thinges being framed by nature to act as they doe So neither concerning thinges done by us \men/ uncertainly somtimes one way & somtimes another (wn ye same thinges are \were/ circumstant) ought there to be any other Cause required besides ye Man himselfe this being ^\essentiall to man to haue/ a Cause & principle |B| in Man to have acc~ons done by him \B/ ^\& to determine himselfe/ Which yet is not to bee understood uniu~sally, for our own Nature & ye lawes of ye universe doe circumscribe us within circumscribe us certaine bounds & limits but wee have a certaine Compasse ^\left/ wthin wch we may be sd to be \have it/ in n~ra potestate \&/ to determine ourselvs to this or yt.

Now it is very observable here yt a Freewilled Being is not onely sd to be ἀρχη καὶ ἀιτία A principle & Cause of action ^\& to determin himselfe/ in s doubtfull Cases & where Nature was puzled & distracted till ye very doing of ye Acc~ons, but also whereafter consultac~on & deliberac~on all d~bt & distracc~on was removed & wee were \where we/ clearly {illeg} \perceved/ yt this ought to bee done & not ye other because though Consulting & Deliberating Reason in themselves bee ^\belong to Nature be/ necessary, & not free in wch Sense I conceive yt of ye old Stoicks to be true, μεκατῶτας σκέυ εα{illeg} τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐῖνας yt there is no such thing ^\Freewill in/ as consultac~on & Ratiocinac~on considerd in of\them/self|es|, yet it was in our power to consult or deliberate more or or lesse, & so use a Greater & lesser intenc~on in it & therefore yt determinac~on of acc~on wch did result from a full & Mature Consultac~on may wel be sd to have bin ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our own power, & be imputed to ourselves |+| as ye Cause of it. \+/ As though a Sword doe necessarily cut & slash, yet ye acc~on wch A man doth by it either in murdering \killing/ an innocent or slaying an Enemy \{illeg} Murderer/, & Traytour is to be imputed to ye Doer of it because it was sin his own power so to use \it/ or not; Wherefore yt is true of ye Greek Peripatetick

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Ὅ δια τὸν γινόμενον πὰρ' ἀντῷ ἐν τῷ βουλέν εοδας ουλλόγισμον ιομ κατα θ εμενοί τινι ἀυτὸι' αυτῷ τῶ φ{illeg}καταθέσεως ἄιτιος He yt by Ratiocinac~on & Collection move by himselfe in consultac~on doth assent to any thing & assent to \resolve vpō/ any designe, is to himselfe ye Cause of yt Resoluc~on & may be sd to have determined himselfe thereto. And for ye same Reason it is yt Men are not onely blamed for Errour & false Opinions wn they assent to things not cleerly comprehended, but also commanded for knowledge Wisdome & true Opinions, because though Knowledge & understanding be necessary yet |ye| more or lesse improvemt of their understanding is in Ꝑtly to bee attributed to their own selfepower

N. 6th In ye selfe determinac~on of outward Acc~ons there is not onely Θελησις but also κρίσις not onely Will or Command of Acc~on but also practicall Judgmt included & both these κρίσις & θέλησις ^\pract/ Judgment & Will (strictly taken) concurre together to make up yt wch Aristotle calls προαίρεσις or Elecc~on, & therefore both alike (if they be not rather really one & ye same thing) Ꝑperly belong to ye Soul redoubled upon itselfe & selfeactive. &c vide A. L.

N. 7th It is true yt this power of selfe determinac~on is in it selfe much a Greater Ꝑfecc~on than yt of Brutes wch are supposed to be confined to nat~rll Appetites & Instincts wch are alwayes \particularly/ necesssarily determined to one, & have noe Amplitude at all in them. \For/ the selfedetermining Power supposeth an higher Elevac~on of Life whereby a Being frees itselfe somthing by it selfe, loose & released, & hath a Larger scope & Prospect before it a greater Amplitude of Acting & exerciseth more Power activity & Liberty in determining its own actions & governing it selfe: ^\thē being {illeg} determined by Objects/ As it is much a Greater Good or Perfecc~on for any Brute Animall to be at Liberty, to goe up & & down & frisk abt in a Pasture, or for a man to be able to walk \vpō his own legs/ up & down whethersoevr \hither & thither/ he pleaseth, then to be a stupid Foetus or Embryo in ye Mothers womb, or to be alwayes carryed up & down in ye Mothers \Nurses/ Arms & Lap, & to be fed by another.

Yet notwithstanding this is not soe to bee understood as if ye Ꝑfecc~on of this Facultie of Freewill did consist in an indiffert contingent temerarious selfe determinac~on wth to one thing rather than another without reason ie: the considerac~on of Good as ye Measure of it wch seemes to be ye Common & most rec~d Opinion concerning Freewill

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As if ye Glory, Perfecc~on, & Libertie of it did consist in a Blind irrac~onall, selfe determinac~on & in not being bound or ty'ed to any Reason of Good to determine \{illeg}/ it one way rather than another Insomuch yt Many conceve of Liberty & Happinesse as \to be/ one & ye \self/ same thing wth such a Freewill as this, & yt there is noe greater Ꝑfecc~on in God himselfe then such a Freewill and \{illeg}/ Liberty together wth infinite power to enable him to doe any thing indifferently soe ^\yt he can/ not {illeg} any inconvenience thereby & yt it is onely weaknesse & Imbecility in Creatures, yt disables them from ye use & exercise of this Faculty wch otherwise would be their greatest happiness & Liberty.

But if ind Blind indiffert Determinac~on as such be a pure perfecc~on & ye Essence of yt Facultie of Freewill consist in it, then it is plaine yt there cannot be any Sin or Morall Evill in any determinac~ons of Freewill \{illeg}/ there being nothing in nature to put a difference & to make one selfedeterminac~on to be evill ^\whē/ another \is/ Good. Wherefore it is most agreable to this Doctrine to assert yt there is nothing φύσις good or Evil Just or unjust honest or dishonest, but yt these things are wholly made by externall Arbitrary Lawes & therefore there being nothing Superiour to God to impose Lawes upon him |A| there can be noe difference of Good or Evill to him. \A/

Now as it is plainly absurd to count that as Liberty & Perfecc~on or indeed to make it a nat~rll power or facultie for a Man to be indifferently inclined to doe himselfe either Good or hurt to avoid paine & misery or to expose him selfe to it, to save his life or destroy it, to feed upon wholsome \food/ meat or drink poyson & ye like For any one will confesse yt it were much better to bee an Infant carryed up & down in a nurses armes yt wlld doe nothing hurtfull to it than to have such a liberty as this is wch is in none but Mad Frantick Persons. So if there be any φύσις any Nature of Morall Good it is impossible yt this should be a perfecc~on, or indeed a nat~rll Power to be indiffert to determine itselfe to any thing \{illeg}/ dishonesty & Morall Evill being as Contrary to ye inward vitality of Rac~onall beings as Poyson is to ye nat~rll Life of Animalls

All naturall Power as such tends to Good for Good is ye Measure of Power as such & to be able to doe evill or hurt ones self is Impotency & neither Power nor Liberty \but {illeg}/ τον ειτιι ἀξιυῖ τὸτε εῖνας τι ἐλευθιρον ξίαν περι φύσιν πράττει. It is absurd to think yt any Being doth then exercise a Ꝑfective Liberty or indeed any true Power wn it actes contrary to its own nature or hath it selfe And never any Oracle was more true than this τὸ ελέυθερον καὶ τὸ ἐπ ἀυται ξαπῖται τῖ ἀγουθσ Γάγιν. To be at liberty & ones own disposall is desired for noe other Reason then for ye sake of Good

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Wherefore though to have a large scope & Amplitude of acting in order to ones own Good be a power Liberty & Perfec~con, yet yt same εξνοτάτῶν ἀντικειμένον as it is commonly taken ye Power of doing Contrarys & Contradictories in all Cases indiffertly but especially ye Power of doing Good or Evill is noe nat~rll Power or Perfecc~on but a mixture of Power ^\{illeg}/ Perfection & ImꝐfection both together. \or rather ye {illeg} Power of Freewill/ Freewill as a faculty of ye humane soul is intended by God & Nature onely for Good & wnsoever it acts contrary thereunto it is not ꝐꝐly ye Power & Perfection, but ye Abuse of ye Power as shalbe shewed afterward

But it wilbe readily objected here yt of L: A: ^\if it be demanded here How then can be any Contingt Vncertainty in ye {illeg} of \Freewill if it// be onely a Power to Good & a Larger Scope or Amplitude of Ꝑmoting ye same, but so yn \as/ yt wn variety is Ꝑposed to its choice it is by its nature determined to ye best then Contingent selfe determinac~on wilbe quite taken away & have noe place at all.

To wch \this/ wee reply yt ye Mystery & Intrigue of this whole businesse lyes in this, yt L: A: is not a Pure Perfection but a Power or Faculty belonging to imꝐfect Beings wch hath a Mixture of Perfection & imꝐfection to it. All such Beings as are not essentially Good & wise but onely by Ꝑticipac~on have a certaine Power over themselves whereby they can intend themselves both in a way of Considerac~on & \{illeg}/ Solitac~on \&/ Consultac~on in order to ye finding out of wt is best & also of vigorous Exertion Resoluc~on & Strength to adhere to ye same & resist ye Importunity of other Passions & Appetites irrac~onally urging another \a cōtrary/ way & accordingly as they doe more or lesse intend & Exert themselves So they doe differently & uncertainly determine their outward acc~ons, to this or that, better |A| or worse - \A/ But this Faculty is bestowed vpō vs by G. & Nature to their End - that we may be it it Promote ourselves to Good & Preserve o\r/selves in ye same -

|+| Wherefore this is now to be added \+/ to ye Descripsion of L: A: yt it is such a power or facultie in ye Soul reduplicated upon it selfe as whereby it hath not onely an higher Elecac~on of Life above Ꝑticular Phansys & Large comprehensiveness of all its congruities & Capacities, but also a Power to intend and exert it selfe in order to ye Ꝑmoting of it selfe in \to/ Good & Ꝑserving itselfe in ye same. Now \And/ as there is a double Good yt wee are Capable of either ye Animall & Private Good of selfish utility to wch inferiour Reason is ye Director & or yt univ~sall & unselfish Good of {illeg} or ye Divine Life wch yt wch directs to is called Superiour Reason, accordingly there may be two different Species of L: A: The one Animall wch is an Elevac~on above Ꝑticular Phansys & Appetites by a Part having \by/ a Participac~on of yt inferiour Reason wch is a more Comrehensive witt Subtility & Sagacity con <101> concerning ye interest of ye Animall Life together wth a Power of \{illeg}/ intending an exerting itselfe more or lesse in ye use of this inferiour Reason & in Complyance wth ye same. And yt there is such a Lower Species of Freewill is plaine from hence yt Men often blame themselves for being carryed \away/ by ye importunity of some Ꝑticular appetites & Passions to \A/ act contrary to ye reason of their own Utility. \A/ The second is Free will Morall wch is an Elevac~on above ye whole Animall Life; by ye Participac~on of Superiour Reason or ye Instinct of Honesty wch is ye same thing yt ye Platonists call ye τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς or ye Boniform Principle in ye Soul: ie. a sense of Good Superiour to all Private Principles in ye Soul: ie: a sense of Good Superiour to all Private selfish considerac~on together wth a Power of intending & exerting itself by Selfe active Conatus\ion/ toward this Higher Diviner Principle: Now this Elevac~on yt wee here speak of ^\in both kinds/ above Ꝑticular Appetites & ye An whole Animall Life is properly seated in ye τὸ μέρον or middle Power of ye Soul, wch is ye τὸ ἡγεμονουν or Ruling Principle in it, & wch compreends both ye Higher & ye Lower, (For Freewilled Beings are essentially neither one nor t'other;) wch τὸ μέρον middle thing is properly called wee our selves, & as it is selfe-comprehensive soe it hath a power of acting upon itselfe of intending & exerting itselfe more or lesse; of wch difference ^\whrof/ there is noe other Cause to be assigned besides itselfe: & therefore a Power of determining its own acc~ons & of soe Governing & ordering itselfe as yt Blame & Commendac~on may ^\differently/ belong to it, Wherefore I say yt ye Genericall Nature of L: A: is not A ἀδιαφορία Dull & lank Indifferency but power over ones selfe whereby one is as it were in ones own hand, Ἀυτεξουσιότης Sui potestas or Selfe-power.

It is ye priviledge of ye Deity yt it is essentially its own Ꝑfecc~on Goodnesse & wisdome immutable & unalterable ^\vndiminishable & vnexegatable/ that it hath noe laborious Conatus or endeavour after any thing noe active exertion of it selfe wth paines & difficulty, it doth never d~btfully consult or deliberate concerning any thing & is never to seek wt to doe, & Is alwayes its utmost possibility wtsoever it can bee; It doth not graspe after its own fleeting & fugitive Being but wth easie Ꝑfect security enjoy itselfe, \{illeg}/ there being noe variac~on or shadow of change in it. but \in/ all other Beings below God & above Brutes are the Case is otherwise; for they have ye Good & Ꝑfection of their own Being not by necessary Being \Nature/ but by selfe active Exertion & Conac~on; & therefore ^\{illeg}/ they are Capable both of encrease & Diminuc~on of their own Good & happinesse as they doe more or lesse intend or exert themselves. Whereas there is a higher & a Lower a Better & a worse Principle in ye nature of all Freewilled Beings

Cite as: Ralph Cudworth, A Discourse concerning Liberty and Necessity: Phase 1 Part 4 [British Library Additional MS 4981] (c.1658-c.1663), http://dev.cambridge-platonism.divinity.cam.ac.uk/view/texts/diplomatic/CudworthBLAddMS4981, accessed 2019-09-17.